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Implementation Remains the Achilles Heel 




The potential power of Africa is undisputed. The continent is home to a large, 
young population and is a potential economic powerhouse in the world. In order 
to realise its full potential, the African Union (AU) must guide the continent. 
The AU, has however, repeatedly faltered in this regard. The implementation 
mechanisms of the AU seem to be its Achilles’ heel. The AU suffers no shortage of 
well-formulated policies; instead it suffers from a chronic inability to follow up on 
these policies. This paper maps the formation of the AU, the promise it held and 
the factors that limit the ability of the AU to implement its programs and policies. 
The paper then briefly examines the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
looking at the problems of implementation it has faced and how these may be 
remedied. 
I. The Promise of the African Union
In 2002, when the African Union (AU) was formed it was hailed as a new 
dawn for the African continent. The new body was seen as an invigorated and 
refreshed institution that would tackle the problems facing the continent. Its pre-
decessor, the Organisation of  African Unity (OAU) had largely lost its grip on 
the crises in the continent1 and had largely failed to act on major issues unfolding 
on the continent.2 Its influence had waned and instead the OAU had earned the 
sarcastic title of  a ‘Club of  Africa’s Big Men.’3
* The author is a student at Strathmore Law School in Nairobi, Kenya.
1 Editorial, The Mirror, Accra (1993).
2 For instance, the 1994 Rwanda Genocide.
3 Okumu W, ‘The African Union: Pitfalls and prospects for uniting Africa’, 62 Journal of  International 
Affairs, (2009), 102.
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The OAU was in many ways a toothless dog with its constitutive charter 
rendering the OAU’s executive and administrative branches ineffective by ac-
cording them only limited powers. Further, the resolutions of  the OAU Assem-
bly were not legally binding on members, which made the organization no more 
than a deliberative forum to ‘talk shop’ and not follow up with implementation.4
As the number of  armed conflicts in the continent rose and dictatorial 
governments became increasingly more restrictive, it became clear that the great-
est achievement of  the OAU would remain political emancipation of  colonized 
states.5 In order to tackle the emerging issues on the continent, a different, or 
revamped, body was needed. 
In considering the achievements of  the OAU, the Algiers Declaration6 
affirmed that the organisation had ‘played an irreplaceable role in the affirmation 
of  political identity and the realisation of  the unity of  our continent.’7 Indeed, 
the role of  the OAU in the anti-apartheid struggle in South African cannot be 
understated.8 However, the Assembly of  Heads of  States and Government took 
notice of  the fact that the second millennium, characterized by colonization, 
had come to an end and the struggle for self-governance had been successful.9 
Instead, the third millennium, characterized by challenges such as globalization, 
international conflict and trends in the world economy that were unfair to African 
countries, had arrived.10 For this reason, the Heads of  States and Government 
recognized the need for ‘a mutually beneficial and genuine international 
partnership; a partnership based on a balance of  interests and mutual respect.’11
The Algiers Declaration was followed by the Sirte Declaration,12 which for-
mally announced the intention to form the AU. The declaration read in part as 
follows:
4 Center for Conflict Resolution, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress, and prospects, 2012, 6. 
5 Nmehielle V and Katherine A, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism under the African Union and 
its initiative: the new partnership for Africa’s development’ 98 Proceedings of  the Annual Meeting of  The 
American Society of  International Law, 2004, 240. 
6 Algiers Declaration, 1999.
7 Algiers Declaration, 1999. 
8 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress, and prospects, 7.
9 Algiers Declaration, 1999.
10 Algiers Declaration, 1999. 
11 Algiers Declaration, 1999. 
12 Sirte Declaration, 1999.
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‘In order to cope with those challenges and to effectively address the new social, politi-
cal and economic realities in Africa and in the world, we are determined to fulfil our 
peoples’ aspirations for greater unity in conformity with the objectives of  the OAU 
Charter and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. It is also our 
conviction that our Continental Organisation needs to be revitalised in order to be able 
to play a more active role and continue to be relevant to the needs of  our peoples and 
responsive to the demands of  the prevailing circumstances’13
Following the Sirte Declaration, the Council of  Ministers and the Secretary-
General of  the OAU were tasked with formulating the framework that would 
govern this new partnership.14 The Constitutive Act of  the AU was the fruit of  
this labour.15
The Constitutive Act establishes the AU as a functionalist organization16 
whose aim is to achieve greater unity and solidarity among the African people(s). 
The Act provides that the AU will seek to accelerate the political and socio-
economic integration of  the continent17 as well as promote peace, security and 
stability.18 More important for this paper, the Act also provides that the AU will 
aim to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and 
good governance.19
II. The African Union Thirteen Years On
Thirteen years after its formation, the AU has nonetheless struggled to 
make an impact in the way that was previously hoped. While the number of  
multi-party political systems in Africa has increased, the quality of  democracy in 
many countries has been arguably declining since 2005, in particular, the curtail-
ing of  political rights during elections.20 In a similar manner, while the number of  
civil wars has decreased since the creation of  the AU from eight in 2002 to four 
in 2012, the number of  localised crises that turn violent have risen.21 Further, the 
13 Paragraph 6, Sirte Declaration, 1999. 
14 Article 8(3) and (4), Organisation of  African Unity (Assembly of  Heads of  State and Government), Sirte 
Declaration 1999.
15 The Act was adopted on 11th July 2000 and entered into force on 26th May 2001. 
16 A functionalist organisation is one that focuses on common interests shared by states rather than 
self-interest. 
17 Article 3 (c), The Constitutive Act of  the African Union (2002).
18 Article 3 (f), The Constitutive Act of  the African Union (2002).
19 Article 3 (g), The Constitutive Act of  the African Union (2002).
20 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress, and prospects, 2012, 3. 
21 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress, and prospects, 2012, 3. 
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AU has also done little to effectively intervene in civil conflicts in countries such 
as the Democratic Republic of  Congo and South Sudan.22
The global scourge of  terrorism has not spared the African continent with 
groups such Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab proving to be a menace in West and 
East Africa respectively.23 While the continent has progressive legal instruments 
aimed at fighting terrorism,24 once again implementation has proven to be dif-
ficult.25 In fact the AU Peace and Security Council26 openly noted that:
‘Despite the progress made in developing a comprehensive normative and operational 
counter-terrorism framework, serious gaps continue to exist in terms of  implemen-
tation and follow-up, thus undermining the effectiveness of  Africa’s response to the 
threat of  terrorism and violent extremism.’27
The AU has also largely failed to assert itself  on the international stage to 
the extent that was hoped. This is easily illustrated by the action taken by the 
United Nations (UN) in the Libyan conflict in 2011. The UN sidestepped the AU 
in allowing the intervention of  the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
in the country- despite the fact that intervention went against the AU’s plan for 
peace in Libya.28 What is perplexing is that the three African states on the Secu-
rity Council at the time voted in favour of  this action.29
Therefore, it is mostly clear that the AU has struggled to live up to expecta-
tions.
22 Kimenyi M, ‘An African Union for an emerging Continent: Reforms to increase effectiveness’ The 
Brookings Institution: Africa Growth Initiative, 2015, 32.
23 In 2014, Boko Haram and related actors committed hundreds of  attacks in Nigeria resulting in over 
5, 000 casualties while in Kenya attacks by Al-Shabaab resulted in 200 deaths- Kenya’s deadliest year 
against the group. See: US Department of  State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, 11.
24 Including the 2001 Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, 2002 AU Plan Of  Action On The 
Prevention And Combating Of  Terrorism, 2004 Protocol To The OAU Convention On The 
Prevention And Combating Of  Terrorism and The 2014 Resolution 276 On Terrorist Acts In Africa
25 Allison S, ‘Good talk, not enough action: The AU’s counter-terrorism architecture, and why it 
matters’ Policy Brief  for Institute of  Security Studies (2015), 5.
26 The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the AU’s standing decision-making body responsible for 
the maintenance of  continental peace and security. It has 15 members, elected by the AU Executive 
Council on regional basis (three from Central Africa; three from East Africa; two from North Africa; 
three from Southern Africa; and four from West Africa). 
27 Communiqué of  the Peace and Security Council, 455th meeting at the level of  Heads of  State and 
Government, Nairobi, 2 November 2014.
28 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress and prospects, 2012, 11. 
29 South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon voted ‘Yes’ to UN Resolution 1973 which formed the legal basis 
for military intervention in Libya. See more at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.
html on January 20 2016.
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III. The Tale of the Achilles Heel
The term ‘Achilles heel’ is derived from the tale of  Achilles as told in Greek 
mythology.30 Achilles was the son of  a Greek goddess, Thetis. When Achilles 
was a child, it was foretold that he would die young. Upon hearing this, Thetis 
was distraught. She then formulated a plan to take her son to River Styx, which 
was rumoured to offer powers of  invulnerability. She dipped her son’s body in 
the water and believed that he had become invulnerable. However, as fate would 
have it, this was not the case. Thetis had held her son by his ankle and so, while 
the rest of  his body was washed in the magical water, his ankle—covered by her 
thumb and forefinger—was not. Achilles grew to be a great soldier and man of  
war who survived many great battles. However, during the Trojan War a poison-
ous arrow shot at him lodged in his heel – his vulnerable spot. The poison killed 
him shortly after. 
The term Achilles heel is used to mean an area of  weakness or a vulnerable 
spot, in spite of  overall strength. It can be described as a powerful person’s fatal 
weakness—one’s hamartia.
The potential power of  the African continent is not contested. However, 
led by the AU, Africa has consistently failed to live up to this potential. The AU 
has elaborative policy documents and Africa is home to some of  the most pro-
gressive Constitutional Bills of  Rights in the world.31 However, the weight of  
these words is weakened when there is a failure to implement.
The AU faces a myriad of  challenges: corruption, rogue leaders, lack of  
financing, poor co-ordination, and lack of  political goodwill. However, the prob-
lem that this paper will focus on is the lack of  implementation – termed as the 
Achilles heel of  the AU. 
Without an implementation track record, the power of  the AU is reduced 
to nothing – it is the fatal weakness of  a potentially powerful body. This is 
because even solving the other AU problems requires implementation. For 
instance, on corruption, in 2003 the AU adopted The African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption32 to fight rampant political corruption 
on the African continent. The Convention places several obligations on 
30 Olympus Library, ‘The Tale of  Achilles’ http://wserver.scc.losrios.edu/~waxmanr/87online/
student_sites/morco_luisa/myths/tale_of_achillies.html on 26 November 2015.
31 The South African Bill of  Rights is progressive in terms of  its provisions on anti-discrimination, 
while the Kenyan Bill of  Rights is progressive in terms of  its protection of  socioeconomic rights.
32 The African Union convention on preventing and combating corruption, 2003.
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signatories including requirements that officers in public service declare assets 
and sign codes of  conduct, whistleblower protection, procurement standards 
and accounting standards. It is also requires states to establish, maintain and 
strengthen independent national anti-corruption authorities. The AU Convention 
also calls for the criminalization of  a wide range of  offences, including illicit 
enrichment, and contains a broad definition of  the term ‘public official.’ It 
also provides a framework for the confiscation and seizure of  assets.33 Further, 
pursuant to Article 22 of  the Convention, The African Union Advisory Board 
on Corruption, an autonomous organ, was established within the AU.
However, after the Convention was adopted Transparency International 
(TI) noted that, while the document was encouraging, ‘implementation must now 
be the top priority.’34 Yet four years later some countries still had legal gaps in 
their systems that hampered the application of  the convention.35 Furthermore in 
2013, a report by the African Progress Panel presented at the World Economic 
Forum on Africa 2013 found that the continent is losing more through illicit fi-
nancial outflows than it receives in aid and foreign direct investment.36  It found 
that illicit outflows cost the continent just over thirty-eight and twenty-five bil-
lion US dollars respectively between 2008 and 2010.37
Therefore, it is clear that even if  the other AU issues were to be solved, 
implementation would still be crucial. Without implementation, declarations, 
policies, protocols and conventions (aimed at solving whatever problem the AU 
faces) simply remain statements of  intentions without actual follow-through.38 
This is why failure to implement remains the main area point of  vulnerability of  
the AU. 
At this point it is important to answer the question, ‘what does implementa-
tion entail?’ Implementation is the ability of  the AU to move past rhetoric and 
towards action. To achieve this, the AU needs to have a clear strategy to ensure 
actual outcomes from policies. Implementation refers to the complex process 
33 ‘Transparency International Commentary on The African Union Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Corruption’, http://archive.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_
conventions/conventions_instruments/au_convention#sthash.opwQ3oFv.dpuf  on 20 January 
2016. 
34 Transparency International Press Release ‘Towards effective anti-corruption tools in Africa’ 17 April 
2007 http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/uncac_africa on 20 January 2016.
35 Transparency International Press Release ‘Towards effective anti-corruption tools in Africa’ 17 April 
2007 http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/uncac_africa on 20 January 2016.
36 African Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all, 2013, 66.
37 African Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all, 2013, 66.
38 Kimenyi M, ‘An African Union for an emerging Continent: Reforms to increase effectiveness’, 31.
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of  putting a policy into practice by a variety of  mechanisms and procedures 
involving a wide and diverse range of  actors.39 As used in this paper, it refers to 
follow-up mechanisms that the AU has at its disposal, or lacks. These are mecha-
nisms that ensure that African states are accountable to the institution, fulfil their 
obligations and comply with instructions and that policies move from paper to 
practice. Implementation tests policies by gauging whether the policies as written 
down are in congruence with the realities on the ground.40
Admittedly, implementation and compliance can never be perfect. The gaps 
that exist may not even be a result of  any express action to bar compliance.41 In-
deed, even institutions such as the European Union (EU)—which has much to 
be admired in terms of  ensuring compliance, —suffer from these implementa-
tion gaps.42 What is of  concern in the case of  the AU is the extent of  these gaps. 
In this respect, the AU tends to be a norm-setter rather than an implementer 
having successfully drafted several important policy documents but not having 
implemented them.43 This ‘implementation crisis’ also befell the OAU, with the 
organization’s initiatives regularly failing to attain sufficient commitment from 
the continent’s leaders and the international community.44
Before proceeding, it is important to delineate some issues in this respect. 
An analysis of  the implementation powers of  the AU with regard to govern-
ance areas such as democracy, good-governance and economic progress should 
necessarily be differentiated from the ability of  the AU to implement its agenda 
with regard to conflict and war. While conflict and war do indeed fall under the 
umbrella of  political governance, they will necessarily be severed. 
This delineation is informed by the fact that conflict and war are usually the 
final—or most extreme, result of  bad governance.45 They signify the final break-
down of  the state as opposed to other manifestations of  political governance 
39 Dimitrakopoulos D and Richardson J, ‘Implementing EU public policy’ in Richardson J (ed), 
European Union: Power and Policy-Making, Routledge, 2001, 1.
40 Dimitrakopoulos D and Richardson J, ‘Implementing EU public policy’, 1.
41 See generally: Dimitrakopoulos D and Richardson J, ‘Implementing EU Public Policy.’
42 For instance, the area of  Environmental Law has posed a significant challenge for the EU in 
implementing policies across all member countries. See generally: European Union Network for the 
Implementation and Enforcement of  Environmental Law, Challenges in the practical implementation of  
EU Environmental Law and how impel could help overcome them, 2015.
43 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress, and prospects, 16. 
44 Franke B, ‘Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent’s emerging security architecture’, 9 
African Studies Quarterly (2007), 51. 
45 Mathoho M, ‘An African Peer Review Mechanism: A panacea for Africa’s governance challenges?’ 
29 Policy Brief  for Centre of  Policy Studies (2003), 11.
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such as civil and political rights and constitutional democracy, whose absence 
does not necessarily bring the state to a standstill. For this reason, the powers 
of  the AU with respect to these two kinds of  issues are quite different. For in-
stance, the AU is expressly empowered to intervene in grave circumstances such 
as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity46 and when states request its 
intervention to help restore peace and security.47 In all these situations, the results 
per se of  bad political governance have already been witnessed. 
In contrast, the Constitutive Act does not specifically empower the Union 
to interfere in instances of  bad governance. The sanction powers of  the AU may 
be triggered in the case of  default in payment of  contribution to the budget.48 
These sanctions may also be imposed on ‘any member state that fails to comply 
with the decisions and policies of  the Union’49 and the sanctions to be imposed 
include ‘the denial of  transport and communications links with other member 
states, and other measures of  a political and economic nature to be determined 
by the Assembly.’50
This second category is quite broad and can arguably be used to impose 
sanctions as a result of  bad governance. However, this provision is vague, possi-
bly even giving the AU unlimited powers.51 This is perhaps the reason it has never 
been used. Granted, the power to intervene in the issues of  bad governance 
would risk interfering with the sovereignty of  the various states and thus should 
be the last option. Therefore, the solution lies in ensuring compliance rather than 
punishment for failure to comply after the fact. 
For the purposes of  this paper, the problem of  implementation is to be 
considered separately from the powers of  the AU to intervene in conflict and 
war and is instead to be considered in light of  the AU’s other enforcement mech-
anisms. 
Despite this distinction, what is interesting to note is that even in situations 
where the AU has the express right to intervene, it has largely been ineffective 
due to lack of  political will and trigger mechanisms.52 Therefore, if  these express 
46 Article 4 (h)The Constitutive Act of  The African Union (2002).
47 Article 4 (j), The Constitutive Act of  The African Union (2002).
48 Article 23, The Constitutive Act of  The African Union (2002).
49 Article 23, The Constitutive Act of  The African Union (2002).
50 Article 23, The Constitutive Act of  The African Union (2002).
51 Magliveras K, ‘The Sanctioning System of  the African Union: Part success, part failure?’ Paper Presented at 
An Expert Roundtable On “The African Union: The first ten years” (2011), 35. 
52 Okumu W, ‘The African Union: Pitfalls And Prospects For Uniting Africa’, 95. 
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provisions in urgent matters such as war are not utilised, it is even more unlikely 
that the less express provisions will be used in arguably less urgent matters of  
governance. The fact that African states know that there is little to no risk of  any 
action in the case of  bad governance, only serves to further hamper and discour-
age implementation of  these policies. 
IV. Factors Affecting the Ability of the AU to Implement
The next step is to consider some of  the impediments to implementation 
that the AU has faced. Rather than being exhaustive, this list is reflective of  the 
impediments that are in some ways unique to the AU. The reasons proposed to 
explain the failure of  the AU to implement its policies and programs that are 
explored herein are: the existence of  several sub-regional bodies, the improper 
imitation of  the EU model and, lastly, a perception that several governance poli-
cies are not African. 
i. Existence of Sub-Regional Bodies
There are currently eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) offi-
cially recognised by the AU.53 These communities are involved in coordinating 
AU member states’ interests in wider areas such as peace and security, develop-
ment and governance.54
One of  the objectives of  the AU is to coordinate and harmonize the poli-
cies between the existing RECs at the time of  the AU’s inception, and future 
RECs, for the gradual attainment of  the objectives of  the Union.55 However, 
this is easier said than done and the coordination of  these efforts has often 
resulted in a tension of  sorts as opposed to coordination.56 The multiplicity of  
sub-regional bodies operating in the continent has made it difficult for the AU to 
stamp its authority as the overall body in charge and hence for it to implement 
53 These are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Community of  Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), East African Community (EAC), 
Economic Community of  Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of  West African 
States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).
54 The African Union (AU) Commission, African Union Handbook, 2014, 118.
55 Article 3 (l), The Constitutive Act of  the African Union (2002).
56 Woodrow Wilson International Centre for scholars, African Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations: 
Assessing their contributions to economic integration and conflict management, 2008, 8. 
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its programs. The rivalry exists both between the AU and the various regional 
bodies and between the regional bodies themselves.57
Regarding the regional bodies that existed prior to the AU, the issue of  
pulling of  rank has been witnessed. For example, in the area of  conflict manage-
ment, blocs such as ECOWAS and SADC consider that they have greater conflict 
management experience than the AU, which is a younger institution and there-
fore they consider their mandate to be superior.58
RECs also compete with each other in order to secure funding and exert 
political influence, which has made it difficult to harmonize the efforts of  the 
various bodies given that they fear a substantial reduction in independence and 
direct support.59
In addition, there is an overlap or conflict of  obligations, which leads to 
wasted resources or counterproductive competition that distracts from collective 
efforts towards the common goals of  the AU.60 Further, it becomes necessary to 
make decisions regarding the allocation of  resources. Apart from facing multiple 
financial obligations, countries must also cope with different meetings, policy 
decisions, instruments, procedures, and schedules. Given the greater loyalty to 
sub-regional groups, African states would be more likely to direct their national 
resources and infrastructure towards implementing the policies of  sub-regional 
blocs as opposed to those of  the AU. Further, since financial resources are gener-
ally limited amongst African states, the effect of  the monetary trade-off  made is 
very real, given that there is unlikely to be disposable income to invest in several 
programs. 
Using the example of  Kenya, the dominance of  the East African 
Community (EAC) as opposed to the AU is clear. Firstly, the EAC mandate 
has a government ministry dedicated to it.61 This means that EAC programs 
would potentially be implemented faster and better, since they are more closely 
monitored and have greater resources contributed to them. On the other hand 
the AU mandate falls under the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade whose mandate includes international trade, fulfilling Kenya’s obligations 
to international organisations such as the UN, handling treaty negotiation and 
57 Franke B, ‘Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent’s emerging security architecture’, 51.
58 Okumu W, ‘The African Union: Pitfalls and prospects for uniting Africa’, 102.
59 Franke B, ‘Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent’s emerging security architecture’, 50.
60 Franke B, ‘Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent’s emerging security architecture’, 44. 
61 The Ministry of  East African Affairs, Commerce and Tourism.
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ratification and managing embassies of  Kenya abroad, among other functions.62 
Undoubtedly, the AU competes for space and resources in a crowded field. 
Further, Kenya’s contributions to the EAC far outpace her contributions to the 
AU. In 2015, Kenya was expected to contribute slightly over nine million dollars 
towards the East African Community budget,63 while in 2014 she contributed 
approximately two million dollars towards the AU.64 Granted, this discrepancy 
in funding may be reflective of  the fact that the EAC has fewer members and 
hence the financial burden may be heavier, while the AU has more members, 
which allows the financial burden to be spread out. However, even despite the 
difference in membership numbers, it could still be rightly argued that the EAC 
is more of  a priority for Kenya than the AU is. 
This is not unique to Kenya or East Africa. The divide between Northern 
Africa and Sub-Saharan African cannot be ignored with Northern African coun-
tries also being torn between their Arab identity and their African identity while 
West Africa is also divided along language groups. 
One practical illustration of  this is that within the last decade the engage-
ment of  African countries in the AU Commission’s work in Addis Ababa has 
weakened. Nominations for AU Commissioner Posts also fell from eighty-seven 
in 2003 to thirty four in 2012.65 It is therefore clear that African states tend to 
find greater unity and integration within sub-regional bodies as opposed to the 
AU. This translates to implementation of  policies and programs of  sub-regional 
bodies at the expense of  those of  the AU. 
It is important to consider that these regional loyalties are necessarily ex-
pected when one considers the differences among African countries. Some 
would argue that the identity achieved from factors such as religion and language 
supersedes any perceived African unity. Further, due to the vast population of  
Africa, approximately one billion people spread out over fifty-four countries, 
there cannot realistically be effective and strong bonds between the countries 
beyond neighbouring countries.66 For instance, many Northern Africans identify 
more with the Middle East due to their shared religion, culture, language and 
62 ‘Core functions of  Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade of  Kenya’, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, http://www.mfa.go.ke/aboutus.html on 13 September 2015.
63 Nkwame M, East Africa: EAC to Table 201 Billion - Budget, 11 May 2015 http://allafrica.com/
stories/201505111023.html on 24 November 2015.
64 The African Union (AU) Commission, African Union Handbook, 2014, 161. 
65 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress and prospects, 2012, 16. 
66 Franke B, ‘Competing regionalisms in Africa and the continent’s emerging security architecture’, 37. 
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even skin tone.67 The lingual division can also not be ignored, with Anglophone 
and Francophone countries having had a rocky past.68
Other differences are more artificial, such as those along the lines of  co-
lonial masters. African countries colonized by the British are members of  the 
Commonwealth and the influence of  France in the affairs of  her former colonies 
is widely documented.69 In fact France partially fuelled the Anglophone-Franco-
phone tensions in the West African region.70 Once again, allegiance to the AU is 
weakened.
Therefore, it would seem that the priorities of  African states are not aligned 
towards the AU and the body is often relegated to last place- both in loyalty and 
in allocation of  resources and efforts. This hampers its abilities to implement 
(its) policies. 
ii. The False Allure of the EU Model
Another impediment to implementation is that the AU has modelled its 
key institutions and strategies on those of  the EU.71 While this was informed by 
the fact that the EU is the most advanced developed regional organization,72 this 
blind imitation failed to consider that the African continent and the European 
continent are substantially different.73 The AU cannot therefore automatically 
replicate the success of  the EU simply by having similar institutions. 
67 ‘How African Is North Africa?’, BBC News, 23 January 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/3421527.stm on 25 November 2015.
68 Consider the initial response to the creation of  ECOWAS whereby the divide between Anglophone 
and Francophone West African states became clear. The creation of  ECOWAS was intended to 
bridge the gap between the Anglophone and Francophone countries by closing the language barrier 
and incorporating within its framework previous initiatives that were exclusively francophone, 
for example UMOA (Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine). However, ECOWAS was viewed with 
suspicion and Francophone states were reluctant to join. In fact, Francophone States increasingly 
concentrated their cooperative efforts in more exclusive and smaller groupings. See more: Franke B, 
‘Competing regionalisms in Africa and the continent’s emerging security architecture.’
69 An Al Jazeera Special Series news report titled ‘The French African Connection’ explored the 
relationship between France and her former colonies http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/
specialseries/2013/08/201387113131914906.html on 20 January 2016.
70 France was suspicious of  the formation of  ECOWAS and pressured West African states to reject 
the body, encouraging them to maintain Francophone economic cooperation. See more at: Franke 
B, ‘Competing regionalisms in Africa and the continent’s emerging security architecture.’
71 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, Progress and prospects, 15. 
72 Haynes J, Hough P, Malik S and Pettiford L, World Politics: International Relations and Globalisation in the 
21st Century, 315
73 Haynes J, Hough P, Malik S and Pettiford L, World Politics: International Relations and Globalisation in the 
21st Century, 315. 
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To begin with, the EU does not have an official sub-regional bloc. Further, 
even for the regional organisations and groups that (do) arise, the EU has a stable 
democratic framework to resolve and govern any institutional rivalries that may 
arise.74 The EU has a Committee of  Regions, which gives regional organisations 
a voice in its running. The AU, on the other hand, does not have any such organi-
sational structure and hence regional rivalries tend to be more pronounced and 
have more detrimental effects on the workings.75 Therefore, in the case of  the 
EU, unlike the AU, the regional groupings enhance the work of  the EU rather 
than compete with it. 
Further, the EU operates on the principle of  primacy of  EU Law and, where 
there is a conflict of  laws, the EU requires member states to defer to EU law at the 
expense of  national law.76 Keeping in mind that law and policy are interconnected, 
the EU therefore has strong influence on the policies enacted in the states. In fact, 
the principle of  primacy ensures that EU policies are implemented uniformly in 
all states, which enhances integration.77 Therefore, the principle of  primacy makes 
the implementation of  EU policies and programs much easier. One major dif-
ference is in fact the existence of  EU Law, which serves as statute in the various 
countries. This is starkly different from the AU, which operates on the basis of  
agreements, declarations, treaties and other documents, which, while technically 
binding, do not serve as law in the various countries, at least not uniformly.78
The EU also tends to have a greater influence on member states and poten-
tial member states, given the draw of  the potential economic and social benefits 
that the state acquires or may acquire from membership.79 The EU is therefore 
able to impose strict political and economic criteria for becoming a member and 
retaining membership.80 In contrast, the economic benefits of  being a member 
of  the AU are not as pronounced and, thus, the institution does not have an up-
per hand in bargaining to ensure that its policies are implemented.81
74 Franke B, ‘Competing regionalisms in Africa and the continent’s emerging security architecture’, 40. 
75 Franke B, ‘Competing regionalisms in Africa and the continent’s emerging security architecture’, 40.
76 Kruis T, ‘Primacy of  European Union law –from theory to practice’ Ritsumeikan Law Review (2011), 
270.
77 Kruis T, ‘Primacy of  European Union Law -from Theory to Practice’, 272.
78 Without delving into a discussion on monism and dualism, it is important to note that for some African 
countries ratified treaties automatically form part of  the law of  the country. However, even in these 
countries, where there is a conflict between such treaty and national law, national law prevails. 
79 Haynes J, Hough P, Malik S and Pettiford L, World Politics: International relations and globalisation in the 
21st Century, 313. 
80 Haynes J, Hough P, Malik S and Pettiford L, World Politics: International relations and globalisation in the 
21st Century, 313. 
81 For instance trade on the continent is still primarily competitive (similar goods and similar markets) 
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Further, the EU started off  with a significantly lower number of  members, 
six countries, and was able to achieve its successful integration at a gradual pace.82 
The AU, on the other hand, set out to achieve its integration goals with fifty-three 
members.83 In line with this, the AU set out to establish, at its inception, bodies 
that the EU established over a number of  years.84 In addition to this, the EU 
began with more mature and affluent nations, while the AU was formed with 
emerging, and, in many cases fragile, nations that were considerably poorer.85
Therefore, modelling the AU after the EU without regard for these struc-
tural differences between the two continents has presented a problem for the AU. 
The structural make-up of  the AU therefore affects its ability to implement its 
programs. Granted that it is no longer possible to go back, it is possible to revise 
existing structures and processes to compensate for these differences and reflect 
the reality of  the African continent. 
iii. ‘Africanisation’ of Solutions
Over the past few years there have been increasing calls to provide ‘African 
solutions to African problems.’ These calls stem from the perception that for 
a long time, there have been attempts to solve African problems with Western 
solutions. 
Africa’s relations with the international legal regime have not been entirely 
cordial with the memories of  colonialism still fresh86 and imperialism still argu-
ably alive. For this reason, African states have often been sceptical of  and hostile 
to suggestions by Western countries of  solutions to their problems.87 This trans-
lates to reluctance in implementing programs suggested by these powers. 
In order to rectify this, the AU has become increasingly innovative in its at-
tempts to shrug off  this influence and instead to assert Africa’s position as one of  
equal standing and sovereignty. There is therefore a tendency to be more inward-
as opposed to complementary. States therefore find greater trade partnerships externally than from 
within.
82 Barbarinde O, ‘The EU as a model for the African Union: The limits of  imitation’, 7 Jean Monnet/
Robert Schuman Paper Series (2007), 9. 
83 The Constitutive Act of  the African Union (2002), Preamble.
84 Barbarinde O, ‘The EU as a Model for the African Union: The limits of  imitation’, 10.
85 Barbarinde O, ‘The EU as a Model for the African Union: The limits of  imitation’, 9.
86 Consider the debate surrounding the establishment of  the African Court of  Justice and Human 
Rights in 2014, which was rife with accusations of  imperialism.
87 Nmehielle V and Katherine A, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism under the African Union and 
its initiative: The new partnership for Africa’s Development’, 240. 
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looking when providing solutions. Such Africanisation, characterized by building 
national capacity in the form of  think-tanks, universities and policy makers,88 
could help accelerate the implementation of  Africa’s reform programs.89
Therefore it is clear that these three impediments are largely unique to the 
AU (perhaps even characteristic of  the institution) and must be considered when 
analysing the pitfalls of  the organisation. 
iv. The New Partnership for Development (NEPAD) and the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
The implementation gaps existing within a specific AU program, the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), are not to be shunned. Perhaps the boldest 
attempt to provide an African solution to an African problem was pioneering the 
APRM, which is a program under The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD).
NEPAD is an economic development program of  the AU adopted at the 
thirty-seventh session of  the Assembly of  Heads of  State and Government in 
July 2001.90 It is intended to address critical challenges facing the continent such 
as poverty, development and Africa’s marginalisation internationally.91
In 2002, at a NEPAD Heads of  State Implementation Committee (HSIC) 
members of  the organization approved a Declaration on Democracy, Politi-
cal, Economic and Corporate Governance. This Declaration, together with the 
APRM, was then submitted to the AU Summit as the final governing authority 
of  NEPAD. Therefore, in order to participate in the APRM, member states must 
sign onto the NEPAD Declaration.92
The APRM is considered to be one of  the most innovative aspects of  
NEPAD.93 Launched in 2003, it is a process for assessing political, economic, 
and corporate governance and socio-economic development in participating 
countries.94 Through the APRM, African countries submit to and facilitate 
88 CCR, The African Union at ten: Problems, progress, and prospects, 16. 
89 CCR, The African Union At Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 16. 
90 Cilliers J, ‘NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism’ Institute for security studies (2002), 2.
91 NEPAD, http://www.nepad.org/history on 13 December 2015.
92 Cilliers J, ‘NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism’, 3.
93 Cilliers J, ‘NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism’, 1.
94 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’ 30, Human Rights Quarterly (2008), 41.
Imani Jaoko
16 Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
periodic peer reviews, and accept to be guided by agreed parameters for good 
governance at both the political and economic levels.95 The program is designed to 
help African states create an enabling environment for sustainable development 
and good governance. Africa is the only region in the world with an extensive 
governance peer review mechanism voluntarily agreed to by the member states.96
It is an ambitious development project that emanated from the philosophy 
of  African renaissance and rebirth.97 The program was created as a collective 
African response to globalisation and was intended to assert that Africa is equal 
to the rest of  the world, and that there was a need to establish partnerships with 
developed countries and international financial institutions, on the basis of  mu-
tual obligations and commitments.98
At its inception there was great excitement and hope about the potential 
power of  the APRM as a tool to ensure good political and economic govern-
ance on the continent. Most good-governance initiatives in Africa are perceived 
as being the wishes of  Western donors and international financial institutions 
which are similarly seen as proxies of  these Western powers. It was hoped that 
the APRM would be insulated from some of  the usual problems that befall other 
attempts to improve governance in Africa. The reasons were that, firstly, it was a 
pioneering concept by African states, therefore the accusations of  Western impe-
rialism or imposition of  Western standards could not be fronted. It is the African 
states that not only chose the areas to be assessed but also chose the manner of  
assessment- the entire process is guided by fellow African states. From this re-
sounding endorsement of  autonomy, one would imagine that the APRM would 
be taken more seriously than any other good-governance programs. Secondly, 
it is a volunteer program hence it was hoped that the states involved would be 
more likely to implement the policy. It was assumed that a country that voluntar-
ily accepted the program would implement policies as the criticisms that would 
arise would not be unwanted or unwelcome, but rather a sign of  wanting to 
improve. Thirdly, several of  the APRM’s objectives lie in the ‘soft’ areas of  socio-
95 Cilliers J, ‘NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism’, 3
96 Rashed A, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Its role in fostering the implementation of  sustainable 
development goals’, UN High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), New York, 
30 June 2015.
97 Nmehielle V and Katherine A, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism under the African Union and 
its initiative: The new partnership for Africa’s Development’, 242. 
98 Nmehielle V and Katherine A, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism Under the African Union and 
its Initiative: The new partnership for Africa’s development’, 242. 
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economics, as opposed to the more controversial areas of  conflict and war.99 It 
was therefore assumed that the APRM would easily receive support. 
However, twelve years after its inception, the enthusiasm has largely waned 
with hardly any convincing evidence of  its success despite the favourable condi-
tions for its growth. For instance, the countries that have undergone the process 
had little or nothing to show by way of  improved ranking in the 2014 Ibrahim 
Index of  African Governance.100 It would have been assumed that a program 
exclusively dedicated to solving governance programs would result in better gov-
ernance rating for countries that participate in it. The results are, however, a 
mixed bag and there is little-to-no linkage between the APRM process and any 
improved governance in a country.101 Of  course, this has done little to win over 
the sceptics of  the program and has put the APRM on the defensive to justify 
the goodwill extended to it at its inception102 as well as its continued existence. 
However, as will be seen, the APRM is a viable project that mostly fails, like many 
AU programs, at the last leg of  the process-implementation. 
v. The APRM Process
The APRM broadly focuses on the area of  governance and has four main 
thematic areas: Democratic and Political Governance,103 Economic Governance 
99 Nmehielle V and Katherine A, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism Under the African Union and 
its Initiative: The new partnership for Africa’s development’, 241. 
100 Gruzd S and Turianskyi T, ‘Do African Union Governance reviews work?’ South African Institute 
of  International Affairs, 20 October 2014 http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/do-african-union-
governance-reviews-work on 11 December 2015.
101 Gruzd S and Turianskyi T, ‘Do African Union Governance Reviews Work?’ South African Institute 
of  International Affairs, 20 October 2014http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/do-african-union-
governance-reviews-work on 11 December 2015
102 Gruzd S, ‘Africa’s evolving governance architecture: Reflections on the African Peer Review 
Mechanism’ Centre for Policy Studies, 2009, 10.
103 This refers to issues such as prevention and reduction of  intra- and inter-state conflicts; Constitutional 
democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of  law, 
citizen rights, and supremacy of  the Constitution; promotion and protection of  economic, social, 
and cultural rights, civil and political rights as enshrined in African and international human rights 
instruments; Uphold the separation of  powers, including the protection of  the independence of  
the judiciary and of  an effective legislature; Ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office 
holders and civil servants; Fight corruption in the political sphere; Promotion and protection of  the 
rights of  women, children and young persons and vulnerable groups including internally displaced 
persons and refugees.
Imani Jaoko
18 Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
and Management,104 Corporate Governance105 and Socio-Economic Develop-
ment.106 There are four kinds of  review available under the APRM framework. 
The first, country review, which is the base review, is carried out within eighteen 
months of  a country becoming a member of  the APRM. The second is a period-
ic review, which takes place every two to four years. The third is a review that can 
be solicited by a member country for its own reasons. The fourth type consists 
of  reviews that can be instituted by the APR Forum in a spirit of  helpfulness to 
the government of  a participating country where there are signs of  impending 
political or economic crisis.107
The structure of  the APRM consists of  the Committee of  Participating 
Heads of  States (APR Forum) as the highest decision-making authority; the 
Panel of  Eminent Persons (APR Panel) as the overseeing body; the APRM Sec-
retariat (APR Secretariat); and the Country Review Team (APR Team).108
The review process has five steps: First, a background study of  the country 
in question is conducted. This step requires that the country conducts a self-as-
sessment and produces a preliminary Plan of  Action. This assessment is guided 
by a questionnaire provided by the APRM. The different states are given leeway 
to determine how to conduct this self-assessment. For instance, Ghana con-
vened a national governing council made up of  independent professionals, while 
104 This includes efforts to promote macroeconomic policies to support sustainable development; 
Implement sound, transparent and predictable government economic policies; Promote sound 
public finance management; Fight corruption and money laundering; Accelerate regional integration 
by participating in the harmonization of  monetary, trade and investment policies.
105 This includes efforts to promote an enabling environment and effective regulatory framework for 
economic activities; Ensure that corporations act as good corporate citizens with regard to human 
rights, social responsibility and environmental sustainability; Promote adoption of  codes of  good 
business ethics in achieving the objectives of  the corporation; Ensure that corporations treat all 
their stakeholders (shareholders, employees, communities, suppliers and customers) in a fair and just 
manner; Provide for accountability of  corporations, directors and officers.
106 This includes efforts to promote self-reliance in development and build capacity for self-sustaining 
development; Accelerate socioeconomic development to achieve sustainable development and 
poverty eradication; Strengthen policies, delivery mechanisms, and outcomes in key social areas 
including education and combating of  HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases; Ensure 
affordable access to water, sanitation, energy, finance (including micro-finance), markets, ICT, 
shelter, and land for all citizens, especially the rural poor; Progress towards gender equality in all 
critical areas of  concern, including equal access to education for girls at all levels; Encourage broad-
based participation in development by all stakeholders at all levels.
107 Mangu M, ‘The African Union and the promotion of  democracy and good political governance 
under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 years on’, 6(1) Africa Review, (2014), 64- 65.
108 See ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism organisation and process, NEPAD/HSCIC-3-2003/
APRM/Guideline/ O&P, 2003. 
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Kenya formed an Inter-Ministerial Task Force for the same.109 This background 
research is supposed to involve civil society, business and government. The pur-
pose is to assess the country’s strengths and weaknesses on the issues contained 
in the review and to identify gaps in governance.110
The second stage is the country review mission whereby eminent panel 
members of  the APRM111 lead missions to the various review countries. This 
independent team of  African experts visits the country to do its own assess-
ment.112 The purpose of  these missions is to “learn about the perspectives of  
the different stakeholders on governance in the country and to clarify the issues 
identified in the Issues Paper that are not taken into account in the preliminary 
Programme of  Action of  the country, and to build consensus on how these 
could be addressed.”113 It is at this stage that consultations are held with the gov-
ernment and other entities in the state.
The third step in the process is the writing of  the country review report. 
This report is a summary of  the country’s self-assessment, the findings of  the 
mission trip as well as the recommendations of  the Panel.114 The report is crucial 
as it from this document that the National Plan of  Action (NPoA) stems. 
The fourth step in the process is the tabling of  the report before the APRM 
Forum of  the Heads of  State and Government. The eminent person in charge 
of  the country presents this report. The heads of  state then debate the report. 
This is the actual manifestation of  the peer-review nature of  the process. 
The fifth and final stage is the public tabling of  the report in key regional 
and sub-regional structures six months after the APR Forum has considered it.
vi. National Plan of Action (NPoA)
The APRM has experienced difficulties at each of  these five stages. For 
instance, there have been complaints that the self-assessment questionnaire pro-
109 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’, 49. 
110 Gruzd S, ‘Peace, security and the African Peer Review Mechanism: Are the tools up to the task?’ 
African Security Review, 56.
111 For instance, Ms. Graca Machel led the country mission in Kenya
112 Gruzd S, ‘Peace, security and the African Peer Review Mechanism: Are the tools up to the task?’, 56. 
113 ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism organisation and process’, NEPAD/HSCIC-32003/APRM/
Guideline/ O&P, 2003. 
114 Gruzd S, ‘Peace, security and the African Peer Review Mechanism: Are the tools up to the task?’ 56. 
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vided is too vague, complicated, and repetitive and fails to ask the pertinent ques-
tions.115 There have also been criticisms that some countries have excluded civil 
society in formulating country reports,116 despite the fact that it is a crucial actor. 
Further the presentations of  the reports before the Forum have also been faulted 
as failing to be critical enough and place states on the spot. 
However, the issue of  this paper is on the NPoA. This document is the cul-
mination of  the research and assessment period and is the guiding light for going 
forward. A weak, vague or untrue NPoA is a drawback to the entire process. 
While the actual review process ends after about eighteen months, the NPoA is 
the document that must outlive the actual review process and be implemented in 
the coming years. 
However, this is not the case. The NPoAs produced by the countries have 
often been little more than policy documents whose recommendations remain on 
paper. The aim of  the APRM process is not simply to document the governance 
problems facing various African states but rather to solve these problems. If  the 
problems surrounding the NPoA are not resolved, then the APRM process will 
remain a documentation process. 
The NPoAs drafted suffer from several deficiencies. Firstly, they are not 
truly reflective of  the reality on the ground. In some APRM countries, the civil 
society has been left out of  the review process.117 This means that some of  the 
NPoAs are not a complete reflection of  the situation. This hinders the actual 
implementation of  the document since, in a bid to paint a rosy picture, serious 
issues have been overlooked. 
The second deficiency in the NPoAs has been that the recommendations 
have been largely aspirational with the states giving no plans on how to im-
plement them. One clear illustration of  this is the assessment of  the financial 
implications of  implementing the plan. For instance, it was estimated that the 
cost of  implementing the NPoA programs are ninety five million US dollars for 
Rwanda, and five billion US dollars for Ghana as well as for Kenya.118 It is quite 
115 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’, 74. 
116 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The First Reviews and the 
way forward’, 52. 
117 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The First Reviews and the 
way forward’, 52. 
118 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’, 70-71. 
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clear that these countries lack any such resources. The assumption therefore is 
that these recommendations were nothing more than a wish-list created by the 
states with almost no intention of  implementing them. This assumption is fur-
ther supported by the fact the NPoAs had no indications of  how this funding 
would be sourced. 
The NPoAs also largely fail to identify how the existing state institutions 
will be integrated into the implementation process. What cannot be ignored is 
the fact that national institutions may exist whose mandate is similar or even 
identical to some areas of  the APRM mandate, for instance National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and the Ombudsman offices. 
From the foregoing establishments, it is clear that the NPoAs need to be 
clearer and more specific to guarantee accountability and enforcement. 
a) The APRM and the Three Impediments to Implementation
At this point it is important to consider the APRM in light of  the three 
impediments to implementation proposed in this paper, that is: the existence of  
sub-regional bodies, the improper use of  the EU model and the lack of  African 
solutions. The APRM is also a victim of  sub-regional competition. While the 
APRM is the first peer-review mechanism it is not the first mechanism set up 
to monitor issues of  governance on the continent. Several sub-regional bodies 
have such mechanisms on a number of  issues such as peace and security, human 
rights and economic policy.119 It therefore seems that the APRM, like many AU 
programs could suffer from the negative effects of  regional supremacy battles. 
It is important to note that these three impediments may not be the exact 
reasons for the failure of  the APRM, and other impediments may play a larger 
role. 
With regard to replicating the EU model, the APRM cannot be compared 
in this regard as it is the first tool of  its kind used to assess governance, and the 
EU has no comparable model. 
The standing of  the APRM with regard to its acceptance as an African solu-
tion is the most perplexing of  the three. As already noted, the APRM was con-
ceived as an African solution to an African problem and was touted as the first 
of  its kind. However, some detractors have taken issue with the funding of  the 
119 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’, 47. 
Imani Jaoko
22 Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
APRM- the program is largely funded by donors.120 Some have used this to argue 
that the APRM could be used as a tool of  these governments.121 Indeed, these 
were the reasons given by countries that were reluctant to accede to the program. 
However, these accusations are dishonest. Nearly all African development pro-
jects and programs are funded partly by donors. In fact, even national budgets 
on the continent are funded by donor money. While funding could jeopardise 
autonomy, it would be odd for African countries to use this argument to attack 
the APRM while failing to consider the economic reality of  most AU programs 
and indeed their own national budgets. Therefore, the criticisms of  the APRM 
along these lines, while possibly valid, can be viewed as unfair in light of  the real-
ity of  funding on the continent. 
V. Conclusion
A well-functioning and effective AU is crucial if  Africa hopes to achieve 
her political, social and economic goals. With fifty-four countries and over one 
billion people of  different ethnic, cultural, religious and language groups under 
its umbrella the AU must necessarily serve as the coordinating institution that 
mobilises Africans to achieve these goals.122 In order that these goals be achieved, 
the institution must show a commitment to implementing its policies. 
This paper has explored the history of  the AU as well as the promise that 
the institution held. Three factors are helpful in explaining the failure of  the AU 
to implement its policies (and how the APRM measures against these factors), 
the APRM process: the weaknesses in the implementation of  the APRM and the 
possible remedies to these weaknesses. In doing so, the paper has illustrated that 
the Achilles heel- the fatal weakness- of  the AU is its inability to implement its 
programs. 
The AU can be termed as the sleeping lion of  global politics. It must not 
only ‘talk the talk’ but also ‘walk the walk.’ Implementing its policies will raise 
the credibility and profile of  the AU giving it a larger say in world politics. More 
importantly, an effective and functional AU serves to benefit the people of  the 
African continent. An AU that follows up on member states helps to protect 
120 Mathoho M, ‘An African Peer Review Mechanism: A panacea for Africa’s governance challenges?’ 11. 
121 Mathoho M, ‘An African Peer Review Mechanism: A panacea for Africa’s governance challenges?’ 11. 
122 Kimenyi M, ‘An African Union for an emerging Continent: Reforms to increase effectiveness’ The 
Brookings Institution: Africa Growth Initiative, 2015, 29. 
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citizens from the excesses of  their governments and serves to remind African 
governments that they are accountable. An effective AU is one that can success-
fully integrate and rightfully take its rightful place as a powerhouse of  economic 
union in the world. 
Without any follow-through, the potential of  the AU remains on paper and 
contained in well-written policy papers but is absent in the daily lives of  Africans. 
VI. Recommendations
In order to close these implementation gaps, the drafting of  NPoAs needs 
to be considered. 
Firstly it is necessary to require that states provide a financial impact 
assessment together with their report. Although it is possible that after the review 
process, the APRM could mobilize funding for countries that wish to implement 
their reports,123 financial impact assessments help to gauge the seriousness of  the 
states. States would be unlikely to attach wild financial impact assessments since 
these would bring into question the seriousness of  the states. This deters states 
from simply listing utopian goals whereas they should confine themselves to 
actual achievable objectives. The states must also be required to give suggestions 
on where this funding may be sourced. This would make states consider more 
carefully what they put in the action plans. 
On the extreme end, this may induce conservatism and make states wary 
of  making several recommendations. The balance must be struck because some 
recommendations, though not entirely realistic, are needed since they are aspi-
rational and serve to create an ideal standard; however, the entire action plan 
cannot be simply aspirational. To do this, states need to receive support from 
the Panel in creating more realistic plans and recommendations in the NPoA.124
Second, there should be mechanisms for civil society to report on their 
involvement in the entire APRM process and to lodge formal complaints if  they 
are being sidelined. These complaints should be considered when drafting the 
county report and presenting it to the forum. 
123 Nmehielle V and Katherine A, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism under the African Union and 
its initiative: The New Partnership for Africa’s Development’, 245. 
124 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’, 70. 
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Third, the role of  the forum in critiquing the NPoAs must be strengthened. 
The forum is the point at which the peer-review nature of  the process emerges. 
It is the stage at which different states must ask difficult questions of  their peers. 
However, what has emerged seems to be a reluctance to be overly critical and, 
in some cases, even glaring discrepancies and omissions have been ignored.125 
While members of  the Pan-African Parliament are invited to comment on the 
report,126 one suggestion is to open up the forum process to other actors- such as 
Non-Governmental Organizations. The APRM was conceived as a state-to-state 
critique and actors such as civil society still form part of  the state. In its current 
form the process may not bear much fruit unless and until governments are more 
willing to be critical of  themselves and of  one another. Non-government actors 
are usually more willing to ask the harder questions and this would help the pro-
cess. Encouraging inclusiveness and even popularizing the initiative would help 
the process too, since people would take ownership of  it.127 The involvement of  
the non-state actors would also increase calls for accountability. While this may 
scare off  African governments who are generally wary of  civil society, it would 
be an important tool to consider in ensuring that actual peer review takes place. 
125 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’, 53. 
126 Killander M, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The first reviews and the 
way forward’, 53. 
127 Mangu A, ‘The African Union and the promotion of  democracy and good political governance 
under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 years’, 68. 
